

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 ACDA-05 ERDA-05 CU-02 OIC-02 EB-07

NIC-01 OMB-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 /091 W

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R 191416Z MAR 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1494

INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 261

AMEMBASSY LISBON

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 1898

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, XG

SUBJECT: CSCE AND WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION

REF: STATE 047641 NOTAL

1. SUMMARY: WE WELCOME THE DEPARTMENT'S INTEREST IN DEVELOPING A COMMON ALLIED APPROACH TO DEALING WITH PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF CSCE. WE BELIEVE THIS APPROACH SHOULD SERVE THE DUAL OBJECTIVES OF EXPLAINING POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN A THIRD STAGE LIMIT TO CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION AND OF AVOIDING AN EROSION OF ALLIED POLITICAL WILL TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE EFFORT. SUCH A DUAL EFFORT COULD BE BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF CSCE AS A PROMISING SYMBOL OF A POSSIBLE TURNING POINT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, BUT AS AN EVENT WHICH, OF ITSELF, DOES NOT GUARANTEE ANY FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IN THOSE RELATIONS. THIS VIEW OF CSCE COULD SUPPORT A SUMMIT-LEVEL CONCLUSION, AS WELL AS THE CONTINUING NEED FOR AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE, AS SOVIET ACTIONS ARE OBSERVED FOR INDICATIONS OF THEIR REAL INTENTIONS DURING THE

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UNCERTAIN PERIOD WHICH LEIS AHEAD. THIS TELEGRAM EXPLAINS

THIS CONCEPTUAL APPROACH AND IDENTIFIES SPECIFIC THEMES  
FROM CSCE WHICH CAN BE USED TO SUPPORT IT. END SUMMARY.

2. BASIC CONCEPT -- WE ASSUME THAT THE CENTRAL PUBLIC  
AFFAIRS PROBLEM OF CSCE IS TO EXPLAIN POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION  
IN A THIRD STAGE SUMMIT, WHILE NOT WEAKENING THE ALLIED  
POLITICAL WILL TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE DEFENSES. THESE  
OBJECTIVES ARE APPARENTLY SELF-CONTRADICTORY, AND WHAT IS  
NEEDED IS A BASIC CONCEPTUAL APPROACH WHICH LINKS THEM AND  
ESTABLISHES THEIR COMPLEMENTARITY. WE BELIEVE THIS CAN BE  
ACHIEVED BY TREATING THE CONFERENCE AS A PROMISING SYMBOL.  
WHILE IT WOULD BE NAIVE TO ARGUE THAT CSCE ITSELF HAS CHANGED  
THE EUROPEAN SITUATION, IT MAY MARK SYBOLICALLY THE TURNING  
OF THE COLD WAR PAGE, AND THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER PERIOD  
IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. A THIRD STAGE SUMMIT WILL BE A  
COLLECTIVE EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT THE PERIOD WHICH LIES  
AHEAD WILL BRING THE REAL RELAXATION OF TENSIONS WHICH HAS  
ELUDED US FOR 30 YEARS. BUT WHILE THE NEW PERIOD WILL OFFER  
FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR NORMALIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN  
SITUATION, THE VERY UNCERTAINTY WHICH IT PRESENTS CALLS FOR  
VIGILANCE, PRUDENCE, AND A CONTINUATION OF THE ALLIED  
UNITY AND DEFENSE EFFORTS WHICH HAVE MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR  
WESTERN EUROPE TO REMAIN INDEPENDENT. THEMES FROM THE  
CONFERENCE ITSELF CAN BE USED TO SUPPORT BOTH ASPECTS OF  
THIS BASIC CONCEPT.

3. A THIRD STAGE SUMMIT -- WE BELIEVE THERE ARE ELEMENTS  
IN THE CSCE RESULTS THEMSELVES WHICH, DESPITE THEIR OBVIOUS  
LIMITATIONS, ARE IMPORTANT, AND CAN BE USED TO HELP TO  
EXPLAIN PARTICIPATION IN A THIRD STAGE SUMMIT:

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF A DETAILED LIST OF PRINCIPLES FOR  
EAST-WEST BEHAVIOR IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT, INCLUDING  
MANY ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THE WEST, SUCH AS A DETAILED  
PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL  
FREEDOMS;

B. ACCEPTANCE BY THE SOVIETS OF THE CONCEPT OF PEACEFUL  
CHANGE OF FRONTIERS, WHICH IMPLIES THAT POSTWAR EUROPEAN  
BORDERS ARE NOT FROZEN FOR ALL TIME;  
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C. ATTENUATION OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE (OBVIOUSLY A  
DELICATE ARGUMENT FOR PUBLIC USE);

D. THE FIRST EUROPE-WIDE AGREEMENT ON MILITARY SECURITY  
MEASURES;

E. SOME USEFUL PROVISIONS FOR BUSINESSMEN DEALING WITH

SOVIETS AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS AGREEMENT TO IMPROVED ACCESS TO BUSINESS INFORMATION, STRONGER ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN CONTRACTS, BETTER FACILITIES FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS STANDARDS;

F. RECOGNITION OF FREER MOVEMENT AS A LEGITIMATE SUBJECT FOR INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION;

G. CERTAIN MODEST STEPS TOWARD OUR FREER MOVEMENT GOALS (E.G. (1) EXPEDITIOUS AND HUMANITARIAN TREATMENT OF APPLICATIONS FOR FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND MARRIAGE BETWEEN NATIONALS OF DIFFERENT STATES, WITH SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR RENEWAL AT SHORT INTERVALS, SHIPMENT OF HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS, AND NO MODIFICATION OF RIGHTS OF THE APPLICANT OR HIS FAMILY (WE BELIEVE THESE ARE BETTER PROVISIONS THAN HAVE BEEN OBTAINED IN ANY FORMAL AGREEMENTS); (2) FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION WITHIN REASONABLE TIME OF APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY FAMILY VISITS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHTS; (3) ENCOURAGEMENT OF GRADUAL INCREASE IN IMPORTED PUBLICATIONS, TO BE DISTRIBUTED THROUGH NORMAL CIRCULATION CHANNELS, WITH AN INCREASE IN NUMBER OF POINTS OF SALE, DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSCRIPTION POSSIBILITIES AND IMPROVED OPPORTUNITIES FOR READING AND BORROWING). FINALLY, WE CAN ALSO ARGUE, OF COURSE, THAT SOVIET INTEREST IN A SUCCESSFUL CSCE HAS SERVED TO FACILITATE OTHER ASPECTS OF DETENTE, SUCH AS THE BERLIN AGREEMENT AND MBFR.

4. STRENGTHENING ALLIED DEFENSE EFFORTS-- THE CSCE EXPERIENCE, AND ITS RESULTS, ALSO OFFER CERTAIN THEMES WHICH REINFORCE THE JUDGEMENT THAT ADEQUATE DEFENSES SHOULD BE MAINTAINED:

A. CSCE RESULTS ARE MORAL UNDERTAKINGS, BUT NOT FORMAL CONFIDENTIAL

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TREATY OBLIGATIONS, AND THERE IS NO WAY OF ENSURING THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CARRY THEM OUT;

B. THERE IS NO EASY WAY TO CHECK OR ENFORCE CSCE RESULTS;

C. SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAS SHOWN THAT THEIR AMBITIONS HAVE NOT CHANGED (ANOTHER DELICATE MATTER IN PUBLIC PRESENTATION);

D. SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO ENTER AGREEMENTS ON MORE MEANINGFUL CBMS SHOWS THAT THEY REMAIN DEEPLY DISTRUSTFUL OF THE WEST;

E. THE MODEST LEVEL OF FREER MOVEMENT RESULTS MEANS WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE REAL DETENTE IS ACHIEVED;

F. CONTINUATION OF A MULTILATERAL EAST-WEST DIALOGUE CALLS  
FOR CONTINUED ALLIED UNITY.

5. PITFALLS-- IN DEVELOPING A PUBLIC RELATIONS STANCE ON  
CSCE, THERE ARE CERTAIN PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS WHICH SHOULD  
BE Borne IN MIND. WHILE THESE MAY SEEM OBVIOUS, IT MAY BE  
USEFUL TO RECALL THEM HERE, IN ORDER TO GIVE A FULL PICTURE  
OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM WE FACE:

A. A THIRD STAGE SUMMIT WILL BE ENTIRELY WITHOUT  
PRECEDENT, AND RECENT PRESS ARTICLES HAVE SHOWN THAT  
THE USG WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN WHY IT IS  
JUSTIFIED. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DO THIS SOLELY ON THE  
BASIS OF THE RESULTS OF CSCE THEMSELVES, EVEN THOUGH THEY  
HAVE A CERTAIN IMPORTANCE. THE CONCEPT OF CSCE AS A  
PROMISING SYMBOL MAY HELP IN THIS RESPECT.

B. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DOWNPLAY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF  
THE CONFERENCE, AS WE HAVE TENDED TO DO IN THE PAST, IF

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 1898

WE ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN A THIRD STAGE SUMMIT.

THE BALANCED APPROACH WE HAVE OUTLINED ABOVE APPEARS TO US TO BE THE BEST WAY TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE SITUATION.

C. THERE WILL BE A WIDESPREAD TENDENCY TO VIEW CSCE AS THE SURROGATE PEACE TREATY WHICH LEGITIMIZES THE DE FACTO RESULTS OF WORLD WAR II. WHILE CSCE MAY BE SEEN BY SOME AS THE BEST AVAILABLE HISTORICAL SUBSTITUTE FOR A GERMAN PEACE ONFERENCE, IT HAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED THE REAL EUROPEAN SITUATION, AND NEITHER WE, THE FRG NOR THE OTHER MAJOR WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD WISH TO GIVE CURRENCY TO THE SURROGATE PEACE TREATY NOTION. HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE, HOWEVER

,  
SHOULD BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH BONN.

WE HAVE IMPRESSION FRG WANTS TO AVOID, TO EXTENT POSSIBLE, PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF GERMAN PROBLEM IN CONNECTION WITH CSCE. IT CAN BE CREDIBLY ARGUED, OF COURSE, THAT CSCE DOES NOT FREEZE THE EUROPEAN STATUS QUO, DESPITE ASSERTIONS TO THE CONTRARY. PRINCIPLE OF INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS PROHIBITS ONLY VIOLENT CHANG; PROVISION ON QRR WILL SERVE TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL

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WESTERN INTERESTS IN BERLIN AND GERMANY; PEACEFUL CHANGE LANGUAGE WILL SPECIFICALLY LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN FOR PEACEFUL EVOLUTION; AND WHOLE THRUST OF BASKETS II AND III IS IN DIRECTION OF GRADUAL CHANGE IN CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTION.

D. THERE MAY ALSO BE A TENDENCY TO VIEW CSCE AS FORMALLY MARKING THE END OF THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE. THIS, OF COURSE, DEPENDS ON FUTURE SOVIET BEHAVIOR, AND MUST THEREFORE BE VIEWED AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY WHICH MAKES CONTINUED UNITY AND DEFENSE EFFORTS NECESSARY.

E. THER MAY BE CRITICISM THAT THE US DID NOT TAKE A SUFFICIENTLY ACTIVE ROLE IN CSCE. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT THE US HAS NOT TAKEN AS ACTIVE A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN CSCE AS HAVE THE SOVIETS, WE PLAYED A LEADING ROLE IN ALLIED PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE, AND HAVE BEEN ACTIVE ON SUCH MAJOR ISSUES AS PEACEFUL CHANGE AND CERTAIN AELEMENTS OF BASKET III. WE LET WESTERN EUROPEANS TAKE THE LEAD IN A CONFERENCE WHICH WAS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THEM, AND SUPPORTED THEIR POSITIONS. THE WESTERN EUROPEANS, WHO MIGHT HAVE CRITICIZED AN ATTEMPT AT AGGRESSIVE US LEADERSHIP, APPRECIATED THIS, AND GIVEN THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE RESULTS COULD HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT, WHATEVER THE US ROLE. DALE

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